Portugal is a crucial case when studying candidate re-selection in a party-dominated setting. While we expect MPs' productivity to be strongly associated with reselection, it should not affect the position of reselected representatives on the party list. These expectations are tested using data on MPs' parliamentary activities across 8 years (from 2007 to 2015), while controlling for alternative hypotheses. Although the two main hypotheses are confirmed, we found that both electoral vulnerability and district magnitude condition the effect of MPs' productivity on re-selection.
Introduction
A well-established research tradition within party politics suggests that the process of candidate selection is guided by factors such as the electoral system, the type of territorial organisation, the specificities of the region and candidates' motivations (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Lundell 2004; Shomer 2012) . However, we still know very little about the causes of re-selection, i.e. when incumbent legislators are reconfirmed as candidates in the next elections. The simple but significant issue addressed in this study is whether MPs in a closed-list PR system are reselected as a consequence of their parliamentary work.
Second, we ask whether a hard-working MP is likely to be ranked higher on the list when reselected.
The study of re-selection is of vital theoretical importance for our understanding of representative democracies. First, re-selection is a key tool for effective accountability because it allows voters to take incumbents' performance into account and to reward (or punish) MPs (Manin 1997; Navarro 2014) . Second, the study of re-selection may elucidate patterns of political recruitment, i.e. the criteria that allow potential candidates to enter into Parliament, their profile and their behaviour (Norris 1997; Best and Cotta lines) are expected to be important criteria for re-selection. Testing these hypotheses helps shed new light on the representative functions of MPs and the role of political parties in political recruitment.
The next section outlines the theoretical framework by discussing the literature on MPs' re-selection. We then describe the main features of the institutional and political background in the Portuguese case. This is followed by an explanation of the data, variable operationalisation and estimation procedure in the data and methods section.
After presenting and discussing the results, we summarise the findings and examine their implications for parliamentary democracies.
Explaining re-selection: theoretical arguments and hypotheses
There is broad agreement in legislative studies that MPs primarily seek re-selection (Mayhew 1974; Müller and Strom 1999) . Although legislators may have other ambitions such as, influencing public policies or being appointed to a government position, reelection is often considered to be their overarching goal. Yet when party organisations dominate the electoral and legislative arena, leaving no space for independents or party switchers, the decision on re-selection lies first and foremost with the party's central office (Riera 2011) .
In a party-centred setting, the process of candidate selection is thus central to understand how parties aim to improve their performance and coordinate the activities and functions of representatives. While a vast amount of studies describe how candidates are selected, little attention has been paid to the factors that may explain why some MPs are reselected but others are not. In an attempt to fill this lacuna, this study draws on an original and The impact of MP productivity is likely to be conditional on the incentives generated by electoral pressures. A number of studies found that vulnerability significantly affects the productivity of legislators (Navarro 2014; Kellerman 2016) . The rationale behind this hypothesis suggests that MPs who are more vulnerable to defeat -i.e. placed in a nonsafe seat position on the list -are likely to exert more effort in their parliamentary work to secure their office. Vulnerable MPs may use their parliamentary performance not only to signal their efficiency to the party leadership, but also as a tool to cultivate a personal vote. Overall, electoral vulnerability is expected to boost MPs parliamentary activities with the aim of increasing their reputation and visibility.
There is mixed evidence on the importance of electoral vulnerability. While it seems to play an important role in the US (Burden 2004; Griffin 2006) , the studies on European countries do not find consistent effects (see Lazardeux 2005; Rash 2009; Soroka et al. 2009; Kellerman 2016; Louwerse and Otjes 2016) . Recent comparative research confirms the impact of vulnerability on constituency efforts (André et al. 2015 ). However, when we limit the analysis to parliamentary questions, the evidence is again contradictory (Martin 2011; Blidoock and Kerby 2011; Russo 2011) . However, a recent study on the Portuguese parliament confirms that 'vulnerable' MPs have a greater tendency to submit parliamentary questions (Fernandes et al. 2017) . We therefore expect vulnerability to interact positively with productivity by increasing the chances of MPs' re-selection, all else being equal (H1a).
The link between parliamentary performance and re-selection may also be mediated by the electoral system. As Norris noted in her ground-breaking study (1997), the structure of opportunities, and the electoral system in particular, interacts with the demand side, namely the (formal or informal) criteria used by gatekeepers. District magnitude is a crucial feature of the electoral system. In districts with a small magnitude, party competitiveness is usually higher and minor parties are less likely to elect representatives.
In this context, deputies may rely on their close links to voters, they usually control the important resources to connect with the electorate and it is easier for the selectorate to have key information on the candidates most deserving of re-selection. Therefore, we hypothesise that MPs productivity will be more important for candidate re-selection in districts with higher district magnitude than in districts with a small magnitude (district magnitude, H1.b).
Some deputies are rewarded by the party selectorate through an appointment to a safer position, whereas others are punished by lowering their positions on the list. While there are a number of studies on intra-party competition under preferential vote systems or when candidates are selected through primaries, the criteria that guide the elaboration of party lists is an unexplored aspect of political recruitment (but see Katz 1980) . When the process of candidate selection is centralised, party directorates are kingmakers as they control who will go up or down on the party list. Consequently, incumbency and party position, i.e whether the candidate holds a party office, are two factors that may provide a plausible explanation for the composition of party lists. Additionally, parliamentary performance may also influence party list allocation, in particular whether or not a prospective MP is placed in the same position on the list following selection. To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies testing the impact of MPs' performance on the composition of the list of candidates.
Drawing on Portuguese and Spanish cases, Montabes and Ortega (1999) found that moving up the party list is not governed by principles of seniority. Candidates placed in the lowest ranks of the party list do not automatically move up to winning positions. In other words, first-time candidates may go straight to the top of the party list, whereas MPs in lower positions do not necessarily become electable. In their the study on Italy, a closed list PR system, Galasso and Nannicini (2015) showed that loyalists, i.e. former MPs or those occupying a party position, are usually allocated to safe positions, while experts, or 'independents', are placed in unsecure positions. Hence, our second hypothesis is that loyalist MPs are more likely to gain safe seats, regardless of their performance in the Parliament (H2).
The Portuguese case
Portugal is a suitable case for examining re-selection in a party-based environment in which legislators' careers are heavily constrained by party organisations. Firstly, it has been noted that MPs' constituency orientation focuses mainly on the national rather than the local level and representatives do not spend much time on constituency activities (Teixeira 2009; Teixeira et al. 2012) . Secondly, Portugal has a proportional representation system with 22 multi-member constituencies and closed lists. As shown by previous studies (Shomer 2012) , this feature has a crucial influence on the candidate selection process and it strengthens party discipline. Voters do not have a say in the selection of their preferred representative, and candidates' names do not appear on the ballot list.
Thus, party organisations are key gatekeepers in the selection of parliamentarians and in holding them accountable. This control is strengthened by Parliament's rules, which grant numerous privileges and competences to party directorates and parliamentary groups (PG). For instance, the distribution of resources (e.g. debate time), the setting of the parliamentary agenda and the election of decision-making bodies is managed at the PGlevel. In addition, procedural rules and institutional constraints help raise the level of cohesion in Portuguese parties.
The overall impression among Portuguese voters is that MPs lack effective and solid links to their constituencies. However, MPs' attitudes vary significantly according to district magnitude . In small districts, notably in the non-coastal area, representatives display stronger ties to their constituencies than MPs in larger districts.
Therefore, the variation in district magnitude is an important characteristic that may interact with MPs' performance.
A number of studies have drawn attention to the high level of centralisation in the candidate selection process in Portugal (Freire 2001; Lobo 2003; Teixeira 2009; Freire and Teixeira 2011) . In particular, the party in central office is responsible for the choice of prospective MPs, and the party leaders often have the final say on the party list to be submitted to voters. Nonetheless, some differences between parties should be noted.
While radical left parties, particularly the PCP (Portuguese Communist Party), emphasise the involvement of party cadres and value the work of activists, the two mainstream parties (Socialist Party, PS, and Social Democratic Party, PSD) tend to be more open and inclusive, and they also show a relatively higher level of decentralisation. Although the Constitution establishes that MPs' mandates are based on national representation rather than territorial criteria, parties are the main de facto gatekeepers for achieving political representation. In a recent comparative work, Krouwel (2012: 252) considers Portugal to be in the group of countries (along with Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands) characterised by a process of 'candidate selection substantially in the hands of the elite'.
Data and methods
To test our hypotheses, we draw on data about written questions and legislative bills Our unit of analysis is the individual MPs. It is not rare for MPs to be substituted during their mandate either temporarily (because of extended leave) or permanently. By law, these vacancies are to be filled by the next fellow candidate on the respective party (or coalition) list. 2 Our data show that this rule is used extensively by parties and individual
MPs (see Appendix). On average, a quarter of active MPs during our three legislatures are substitutes. While the smallest share of substitutions was that of the PSD during the short 11 th legislature (2%, 19% on average during our three legislatures), the CDS-PP stands out for its high replacement rate in the 10 th legislature (54%, 32% on average).
As a result of this between-election intra-party turnover, the duration of individual parliamentary mandates varies substantially. Only 59% of MPs in our data set complete their mandates; 19% stayed in parliament for a period between a few days and a quarter of the legislature (see Appendix). Since our main independent variable, legislative activity, hinges to some extent on the time available in parliament to an MP, the following analysis focuses only on those MPs who were officially 'active' in parliament at least 50 percent of the time in each legislature. This filtering aims to create a level playing field for comparison. Furthermore, we eliminated MPs from the small Green party (PEV), which had no more than two MPs in any legislature, and MPs elected in the two districts representing the Portuguese living abroad in Europe and in the rest of the World. As a result, our final dataset comprises 672 MPs.
Dependent variables
Our first dependent variable is whether the MP was reselected for the party list at the next This is probably due to its relatively short duration; some MPs were reselected to allow them to complete their full 4-year mandate.
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Our second dependent variable circumscribes the data set to those MPs who were reselected (n=432) and it measures whether MPs' position on the list either increases, decreases or stays the same at the next election (categorical variable with three levels).
Since MPs sometimes change the district in which they compete in different legislatures, we do not compare list positions but electoral vulnerability scores as defined by André et al. (2015) . Vulnerability scores are computed by dividing the list position occupied by an MP at t-1 and t respectively by the total number of seats the party won in the district at t- Our models test a range of alternative explanatory factors of re-selection and change in ranking. First, we control for the number of parliamentary committees to which each MP is assigned (COMMITTEES). This is arguably a rough proxy of activity because it does not capture the MP's actual work rate in each of these committees. On the other hand, committee membership is normally associated with a number of activities (e.g. hearings, debate of legislative initiatives) that are highly valued by party elites. Our measure includes both standing and ad hoc committees. In every legislature, the median MP is Finally, RETIREMENT is a dichotomous variable taking 1 when the MP is 64 or older at the end of the legislature (retirement age in Portugal was 65 at the end of the 12 th legislature). We expect little incentive to engage in parliamentary activities for MPs that have attained the requisites for retirement and plan to step down at the end of the legislature.
Finally, our models include control variables for: the party (reference category is the Left Bloc); the legislature (reference category is the 10 th legislature); gender; and whether parties are in government or opposition (the lack of a direct channel to influence government decision-making makes opposition MPs more prone to using agenda-setting tools such as legislative initiative and parliamentary questions (Martin 2011)).
Results

Re-selection
Given the binary nature of our dependent variable, 're-selection', we fitted a logistic regression model. Table 1 displays the results through five models. The 'Base model' tests the impact of our control variables. 'All signatures' and 'first signatures' introduce MP-specific data on quantities of bills and questions signed (the latter differs from the former because it only counts activity as first signatory). The last two models present the result of the interaction between our main activity indicators (PERG_1SIGN and BILL_1SIGN) with district magnitude (MAGNITUDE) and electoral vulnerability (VULNERABILITY), respectively.
As far as our main explanatory factors are concerned, co-sponsoring of bills and questions are positively correlated to re-selection. Co-sponsoring many bills, in particular, is significantly associated with a higher probability of re-selection. On the other hand, when only first signatures are considered, the effect of the coefficient for bills weakens and ceases to be statistically significant. We interpret these findings as evidence that, on average, MPs who co-sign more bills and parliamentary questions are also the ones who re-selection. Their impact was not statistically significant and they were dropped from the model (see the appendix).
tend to receive more invitations to do so. In other words, it is a proxy of the relevance of their involvement in party activities, a factor which should be associated with re-selection.
On the other hand, we can conjecture that being the main sponsor of many bills does not affect the chances of re-selection because the party selectorate values quality over quantity for policy proposals.
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Among the other explanatory factors of re-selection, 'COMMITTEES' displays a significant and positive coefficient. Using "all signatures" as a reference model, one additional committee membership increases the odds of re-selection by a factor of 20% (95% confidence interval[CI] between 5% and 38%). As expected, the odds for MPs who hold or held in the past some type of party office (at national or local level, PARTY_POSITION) are 56% higher than the odds of rank and file MPs (95% CI between 9% and 1.25%). Finally, we find that the prospect of RETIREMENT negatively affects the chances of re-selection: the odds decrease by a factor of 50% (95 CI between 7% and 73%).
H1a states that the effect of legislative productivity on candidate re-selection should be stronger for vulnerable MPs. Our results tell a different story. Both interaction coefficients of electoral vulnerability with BILL_1SIGN and PQ_1SIGN respectively are negative and their statistical significance is weak or null. Figure 3A plots the coefficients of BILL_1SIGN (along the y axis) conditional on electoral vulnerability (along the x axis). It shows that with increasing vulnerability, the magnitude of the coefficients decreases and becomes negative for MPs entering parliament as substitutes (vulnerability greater than 1). 8 This finding suggests that other criteria for re-selection are germane when MPs are at the bottom of the party list. Our interviews confirm that parliamentary productivity is just one of the criteria used by elites to make decisions on re-selection.
Other criteria, such as the renewal of representatives, their territorial representation and links to the constituencies, or their expertise and competence are also equally important to determine the final composition of party lists. Moreover, the internal distribution of power -i.e. the power of negotiation of local party structures vis-à-vis national party bodies -and the discretionary authority of party leadership are additional key factors for
MPs' re-selection.
In order to inspect H1b -positing that the larger the district magnitude, the stronger the impact of legislative productivity on candidate re-selection -we decided to limit our subset to the two largest parties, PS and PDS, which are the only parties to elect representatives in all districts. The interaction between (the logarithm of) magnitude and our two main activity covariates (BILL_1SIGN and PQ_1SIGN) is positive but, once again, it is not statistically significant at 0.05%. Figure 3B shows that only an increase of activities of MPs competing in large districts (Lisbon and Porto) has a positive impact on their probability of re-selection that is significant at the conventional level, which confirms our expectation. While these findings corroborate previous studies on the significant impact of district magnitude (Teixeira 2009; Brack et al. 2012; Pilet et al. 2012 ), we can conjecture that other factors are important in smaller districts such as the ties between the MP and local actors.
TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 3 HERE
Change in list position
Our second goal is to test whether parliamentary activity is associated with a change in list position at the next election. Since we are dealing with a three-category dependent variable -vulnerability can stay the SAME, INCREASE or DECREASE -we chose to run a multinomial regression model. The reference level is SAME. Table 2 reports the results replicating the first 3 models presented in table 1.
Our models reveal that most of the covariates accounting for re-selection do not help explain variation in electoral vulnerability. In particular, none of the coefficients of our activity-related predictors is statistically significant. Keeping all other variables constant, we find that the worse the MPs' rankings are in the electoral list, the greater the odds of being reselected with a lower ranking at the next election as opposed to maintaining the old position. This might result from the inclusion of new higher-positioned candidates in the party list at each election, which pushes already vulnerable candidates further down in terms of ranking. Second, as expected, the larger the district -and the longer the electoral list -the stronger the chances of list mobility at the next election. Finally, the odds of demotion in the electoral list are lower for women MPs than for men 9 . It is also interesting to note that productivity is not associated to a change in list position. This means that MPs holding a safe seat do not display less (or more) productivity than deputies in vulnerable positions.
TABLE 2 HERE
We tried different model specifications (see Appendix). First, we transformed our categorical dependent variable into a continuous one by taking the difference between the two vulnerability scores and ran a standard linear regression. The new dependent variable is centred at 0, corresponding to no change in the vulnerability score. Vulnerability can increase up to -12 and decrease up to 2. Second, we eliminated all heads of the list, since by definition their vulnerability cannot decrease (unless they change district). Finally, we ran our models using observations only on members of the largest parties, PS and PSD, which jointly account for 75% (n=325) of observations. The three model specifications yield remarkably consistent results.
Conclusion
The process of candidate re-selection is of great interest to scholars studying parliamentary elites and, in particular, how political parties affect their careers. This study investigates the factors influencing the re-selection of legislators in the Portuguese parliament. Drawing on the extant literature on candidate re-selection, we formulate and test whether individual parliamentary output has any significant consequence for the probability of re-selection and the position on the party list at the next election.
Our results demonstrate that productivity is strongly related to the chances of being reselected (with the exception of initiating a bill as first signatory). The findings thus confirm the importance of MPs' performance. This association comes with two caveats.
First, contrary to our expectations, electorally vulnerable MPs that are also hard-working do not have a greater chance of being reselected. What emerges from the interviews we conducted is that quality (e.g. the choice of highly politically salient topics which attract a lot of media coverage) may trump quantity for representatives that want to make a name for themselves inside the party. Secondly, as expected, we found that it is mainly in large districts that dynamic MPs have a stronger likelihood of re-selection. In smaller districts, intra-party competition is low and other criteria, such as the relationship with voters and local interests, are more important. Moreover, these MPs have more incentives to work on local rather than on national issues, curtailing the range of available topics to act upon.
As far as our alternative explanatory factors are concerned, we find that the number of committee memberships and holding party offices at either national or local level, respectively, are positively and significantly associated with re-selection. Both results confirm the importance of party directorates, in particular the party in central office, in controlling political recruitment and selecting the profile of national representatives. On the one hand, appointment to more than one standing committee or to specific ad hoc committees can be read as a sign of trust on the part of party elites. On the other, we interpret the relevance of holding office as a demonstration that the 'ideal' candidate, from the point of view of party organisations, is one who has had previous party work experience, and has proved to be disciplined and useful to party organisations. As highlighted also in our interviews, the main criteria used to select candidates in Portugal are partisan and re-selection crucially depends on the position MPs have within party directorates.
As regards our second dependent variable, our data suggest that legislators' activities, as profession, political background, etc.). As a third point, it is worth mentioning the importance of specific organisational cultures that may influence the position of candidates on the party list (e.g. the 'rotation' principle adopted by the BE or the importance of some regional branches in the main parties). In particular, the null effect of seniority can also be attributed to the fact that a considerable proportion of MPs may simply decide, for a variety of reasons, not to run for re-election.
Two issues should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this study. First, a number of factors (personal networks, reputation, voter-MPs contacts, etc.) may play an important role for candidate re-selection but cannot be measured here. As our results show, the model may be underspecified, which means that future studies should try to collect more data and specify the factors influencing re-selection more clearly. Second, examining the failure of MPs who were not reselected may shed more light on the process of candidate selection, in particular with regard to party factionalism or the internal balance of power between central and local party organisations. It is possible that MPs with a political background at the local level find it more interesting to undertake a career at this level rather than being involved in national politics. Following the trajectories of legislators before and after parliamentary experience warrants more scrutiny in future research. Note: Multinomial logit regression, DV is change in list position at the next election, reference category is SAME, effects of party and legislative term are not shown ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 Table 1 . The shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals.
